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Laziness will be a problem for us if it means that we leave undone the work we 
should be doing, but it can be a real blessing when it comes to not doing the work we 
needn’t be doing. It motivates us to identify unnecessary work in order to avoid it. 
For metaphysics we need not be workaholics. Laziness may work in our favour. In 
metaphysics we face much larger decisions than elsewhere in academia, decisions 
that are final and have an infinity of consequences for other disciplines. This is not 
the shop-floor or the middle-management offices. It is the office of the CEO with 
adjoining boardroom. This is where the big decisions are taken. The CEO cannot 
afford to be distracted by details and should probably be fired unless he or she 
spends a decent amount of time with both feet on the desk staring into space. 
To deal with the big picture requires withdrawing into a higher level of abstraction 
and generality than can be achieved by someone rushing around and being busy all 
the time. It requires the ability to simplify, simplify and simplify again, for otherwise 
the complexity of the decisions facing even quite a small company may overwhelm 
the management. 
There is an old joke about a meeting of the elected members of a local council, who 
spend ten minutes approving the new nuclear power plant and two hours on where 
to locate the new bike racks. Sometimes this joke seems to be relevant to the 
academic literature. 
I once watched the CEO of a large local council take it from ninetieth in the national 
performance league table to third in five years. I never saw him doing anything other 
than swanning around in an expensive suit with a holiday tan and never saw a piece 
of paper on his desk. His job was to take very big and very good decisions, not to 
deliver some notional quantity of hard work. 
Metaphysics is about standing back in contemplative mood and gaining a view of its 
problems sufficiently simple that we ourselves, you and me personally, can make 
reliable, clear and above-all final decisions without having to sit through a board 
meeting lasting another two millennia. The refreshments alone could bankrupt the 
business. 
Introduction 
Try as we might to prove otherwise Existence, the existence of anything, the idea that 
anything exists, remains stubbornly inconsistent with human reason. If it is the case 
that anything exists then the world must contradict the logical laws by which our 
intellect takes philosophical decisions. Time, when it is reified, and necessary though 
it is for the continuing existence of anything, is clearly a daft idea and easily shown to 
be so. Space fares no better. Nothing seems to be fundamental. Almost every 
variation on Theism, the reification of God, forces believers to live with some degree 
of cognitive dissonance, often severe, and yet when it comes to the question of our 
ultimate origin none of Mind, Matter, Something or Nothing work even as well as 
God. Almost nothing about the world makes sense according to our usual view of it. 
By rights it should not be here and nor should we. 
There is something about all this that does not add up. It is as if we are making some 
very basic but well-hidden error that turns philosophy and the world it describes into 
an incoherent jumble of impossible phenomena and incoherent concepts. This is 
clearly an error that can be made as easily by professionals as amateurs, for the latter 
receive little or no help from the former as to how to solve these metaphysical 
problems. Pessimism is the orthodox position in academia. It is not necessary for a 
professor of philosophy to understand his or her subject, so low is the expectation 
of employers and so sure are they that the subject is incomprehensible. 
Yet the solution for metaphysics is not a secret and is widely known. The problem 
would be only that it is not widely known in western academia and receives little 
discussion. Here it is not often believed that there ever could be a solution 
for metaphysics and this one is usually dismissed out of hand even where it is 
noticed. It may be partly as a consequence of this that even today there is not much 
literature that explains this metaphysical solution in a straightforward way. 
The proposal here is that a cold-hearted logical analysis of metaphysical problems 
and the practice of Zen meditation will produce the same result if we are successful. 
The former would produce a conjectural theory while the latter would produce 
realisation and knowledge but it would be the realisation and knowledge that the 
theory is true, while the theory would explain how such knowledge is possible. 
The proposal is not simply that the ‘nondual’ doctrine of Zen, esoteric religion, 
‘eastern’ philosophy or ‘mysticism’ is true but, in addition, that it would be possible 
to work this out prior to taking up the practice and armed with very little 
understanding of what this doctrine actually teaches about the nature of Reality and 
the human condition other than what would be required to grasp its most general 
implication for metaphysics. 
Let us be quite clear. The claim here is that almost the entire community of 
professional philosophers now at work in our western universities are making the 
same mistake, that it is a formal mistake, a lapse of rigour, a lack of attention to 
detail, an error that ineluctably renders metaphysics intractable and 
incomprehensible, just as they find it and just as they keep telling us it must always 
remain. 
The solution for metaphysics on offer here is essentially simple and once roughly 
grasped it may seem to have been rather obvious all along. Prior to this it may not 
appear at all simple or even to be visible. To describe how it would work as a solution 
for all the many and various ‘problems of philosophy’ would be a long term project 
but if we take the most general view, as we must in metaphysics, then it can be 
sketched quite briefly. 
We would need only to concede, or to suspend disbelief pending confirmation, that 
by reduction all metaphysical problems are the same problem and thus that their 
solution must be general and the same in each case. If we see metaphysics as a large 
collection of distinct problems each requiring a unique solution then we would be 
failing to see the wood for the trees and making it a thousand times more 
complicated than it will have to be if we are ever going to be able to understand it. 
This much is proved by history. 
This is an attempt to simplify the issues and cover a lot of ground while maintaining 
rigour. It is not an introduction or a carefully constructed argument but a sketch of 
how an argument might be made and an indication of the world-theory that would be 
implied by its success. It outlines the principle metaphysical or logical argument that 
can be made for mysticism. ‘Mysticism’ here would mean nondualism, the claim that 
all division and distinction is unreal. ‘Nondualism’ would mean something that 
cannot be fully explained but which would translate into discursive metaphysics as a 
neutral metaphysical position. 
Metaphysics 
Metaphysics may be defined as the study of absolutes, fundamentals, first principles 
or the ‘world as a whole’. It would be an area of knowledge where physics ceases to be 
useful except as a starting point and constraint on theories and where we have to rely 
on our reason to work out the rest of the story or seek other means than the intellect 
for progress. 
This definition of metaphysics is deceptively simple and it is often skipped over in 
introductions to the topic. We are usually led like innocent lambs straight into the 
fiendish complexity of the details of this or that particular philosophical problem. Yet 
right here in this definition we have the entire problem of metaphysics. 
What do we mean by ‘absolute’? The question can withstand almost any amount of 
thought. An absolute phenomenon would have to be unimaginably strange. It would 
have to be unique. There could not be two irreducible absolutes except by 
coincidence. It would have to be always whatever it is right now and in the same 
place it has always been. It must be both post and prior to space-time. It may have to 
transcend the manifest/un-manifest distinction and perhaps even the existence/non-
existence distinction. How are we supposed to study such a phenomenon? 
And, again, what do we mean by the phrase ‘world as a whole’? Obviously we mean 
‘Everything’. Yet this word is fraught with well-known logical difficulties. In 
discursive philosophy ‘Everything’ is a concept. What kind of thinking could 
encompass a concept that is supposed to include itself? ‘Everything’ makes no sense 
in naïve set theory, for a ‘thing’ would be a set and the ‘set of all sets’ would inevitably 
have to leave something out, namely itself. 
Speaking more psychologically, we cannot imagine the ‘world as a whole’ because we 
cannot include the phenomenon that is imagining it. If we make a list of all the things 
we can imagine there will be something that is not on it. So, if metaphysics is the 
study of the world as a whole it is unavoidably the study of whatever or whoever is 
studying it, and the motto for any successful reductionist study of Reality must be 
‘Know Thyself’. 
In this way, almost as soon as we begin to define metaphysics we run into a problems 
of self-reference that send us careering wildly off into the foundations of 
mathematics, psychology, mysticism and religion. 
This is the problem at the heart of metaphysics, or one way of presenting it, and by 
solving it we would solve all of the subsidiary problems that arise from it. Set 
theorists will recognise it as Russell’s Paradox but it takes on many subtle guises and 
crops up constantly, if we watch out for it, in psychology, metaphysics and religion as 
well in the foundations of mathematics. Essentially it is the problem of how to reduce 
the Many to One. To reduce the world to two phenomena is usually easy enough. 
Mind and Matter would be a common dualism, or in mathematics we might end up 
with just two sets, one of which could be the set of all sets except one. But something 
odd happens when we try to reduce the system further. 
If we do not notice this problem when we start out in metaphysics then it will cause 
us trouble every day from then on until we do. We will be studying a wide variety of 
seemingly discrete problems and will almost certainly become too buried in the 
details to see the global move that would be required to solve them all at once, and 
may not even notice that all these various problems are instances of the same 
problem and are amenable to the same solution. It is at a much higher level of 
generality that metaphysics must be cured, for these many and various sub-problems 
are merely symptoms. 
A Solution 
In order to see how this central problem can be solved we would first need to be clear 
as to the extent of the problem and to have grasped something of its nature. 
Otherwise we may not recognise the solution when we see it and might not even be 
aware of the need for it. A solution could make no sense without a decent 
understanding of the problem. Once armed with this, however, we can make a start 
on narrowing down the search area for workable theoretical solutions until, 
hopefully, just one possibility remains, and then confirm that it would work. 
The first task would require a lot of thought and a literature survey. Only someone 
who has been banging their head against the problems of metaphysics for a decent 
length of time is likely to be able to see the need for a solution as strange and subtle 
as any solution would have to be to work, and as strange and subtle as the one 
proposed here. The second task can be achieved by the usual metaphysical method, a 
process of elimination by logical refutation. By successively reducing theories to 
absurdity we are eventually left with the most plausible. This is inference to the best 
explanation or ‘abduction’ as recommended by Sherlock Holmes and C. S. Peirce. 
Our logical decisions would be taken using Aristotle’s rules for the dialectic and the 
game would be played by working conscientiously to refute every theory that can 
possibly be refuted. 
A Strategy and a Shortcut 
Metaphysical theories may be sorted into two categories. The first category would 
include all theories that are selective, partial, extreme or positive. Such theories come 
in pairs, one for a thesis and one for the opposite thesis. Examples would be 
Externalism-Internalism, Something-Nothing, Materialism-Idealism, Freewill-
Determinism, One-Many, Manifest-Unmanifest. Such theories state that the world as 
a whole is in some case this rather than that, or has this rather than that property, or 
does or does not have properties. 
The second category would contain all metaphysical theories that make no selective, 
partial, extreme or positive claims about the world as a whole but assert, rather, that 
the world as whole, the world seen as whole or from an ultimate perspective, is a 
unity. 
These two categories are exhaustive. The solution for metaphysics must lie in one or 
the other. Otherwise the world is paradoxical and we would be wasting our time 
trying to make sense of it. 
The meaning of ‘unity’ would be a topic beyond this short discussion and in a sense 
beyond all discussion, but we can note that in a metaphysical context this term 
should not imply monism, albeit that it would be rejection of all forms of dualism. 
The meaning is more obviously captured by the negative descriptive term advaita or 
‘not-two’. The crucial characteristic of this unity would be that it cannot be accurately 
described by any partial or positive theory. Any such description would deny its 
undifferentiated nature as a unity. It could only be described by a neutral theory 
using a system of description that replaces natural language with a language a 
contradictory complementarity, one that allows us to speak of it in terms of its 
opposite aspects without committing ourselves to one or the other, just as we use in 
quantum physics and for the same reason. This would account for the extensive use 
of paradox and contradiction in the language of Buddhism and for Lao Tsu’s 
aphorism stating that that words that are rigorously (and thus metaphysically) true 
will seem to be paradoxical. 
We need not delve deeply into all these issues here. In metaphysics the immediate 
significance of this unity would lie in how it would work as a theoretical concept (or 
non-concept) once it is introduced as an axiom. What matters here, initially, is that 
an axiom of unity would imply the falsity of all the metaphysical theories we placed 
in our first category. Their falsity, once established, would thus imply the unity of 
reality at the ultimate level of analytical reduction. As we have already established 
over a great many centuries that none of these theories work in logic, having spent all 
of that time prevaricating between the two extreme views that form the horns of all 
these famous metaphysical dilemmas and antinomies, it might be said to be rather 
obvious that an axiom of unity represents a possible solution for all metaphysical 
problems. 
There would be room for just one theory in our second category and it would be a 
neutral metaphysical position. There would be room for just one theory because 
where a theory departs from neutrality this will entail a positive or partial claim 
about the world as a whole which would disqualify it from this category. 
A characteristic of a neutral theory that would be crucial to this discussion is that in 
logic it represents a solution for Russell’s Paradox. This simple set-theoretic problem 
caused Russell enormous difficulties and it would be no coincidence that so also did 
metaphysics. It did not cause problems for his one-time colleague G. S. Brown and 
nor did metaphysics. This would also not be a coincidence. Brown’s solution for 
Russell’s Paradox, judged successful by Russell, has the philosophical implication 
that by reduction the world as a whole is a unity. This idea overcomes problems of 
self-reference in metaphysics just as in set theory. (It is also Kant’s solution for 
psychology). But Russell did not want to extend this analytical result beyond 
mathematics into metaphysics and so ended his life believing that metaphysics is 
intractable, having along the way persuaded many people to make the same mistake. 
Although this central problem of metaphysics is rarely addressed head-on, 
unimaginable amounts of work have been put into the sub-problems that arise from 
it. The result is a large collection of complex and finely-nuanced partial theories that 
all belong in our first category. Fortunately, we do not need to untangle this rats-nest 
of theories. The most important property that all these theories share is that none of 
them work. Their failure is well known and it is what leads Russell and so many other 
philosophers to dismiss metaphysics as useless. 
What is less well known is that the theory in the second category does work. Many 
philosophers appear to be unaware that it even exists and yet it is the only theory 
that Kant does not dismiss for being one half of an undecidable pair of unworkable 
theories, the only theory that the Buddhist sage and philosopher the Noble 
Nagarjuna does not reduce to absurdity in his iconoclastic second-century survey of 
metaphysical views known as The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, and it is 
widely considered to be the philosophical foundation of mysticism or the ‘perennial’ 
philosophy. As a world-view that extends beyond discursive metaphysics it is 
commonly called nondualism. 
The solution for metaphysics, therefore, would be to abandon all the theories that do 
not work and keep the one that does. Simple enough. Or, it would be were it not that 
the theory that works is mysticism. This is not an uncontroversial result. If 
Nagarjuna’s logical proof is sound then the solution for metaphysics is a theory for 
which the teachings of the Buddha would have to be true. In this case the solution for 
metaphysics would vindicate the mystical tradition and its doctrine of unity as it 
appears in all the world’s principle religions and from the dawn of recorded human 
history. This will be a psychological hurdle for many travelers down this road and it 
is bound to make things less than easy for some. Yet we must note that it is not a 
complication, only a hurdle, and we set the height of it for ourselves. We can simply 
ignore it if we wish. This implication of metaphysics certainly does concern many 
people, however, and it is a concern that clearly works against progress in 
philosophy. It need not concern us here. We are looking for a solution and this one 
seems to be the only possibility. Either it works or it fails and we must decide which 
it is before the end of the meeting. 
Francis Bradley, who largely reproduces Nagarjuna’s logical result in his 1898 essay 
Appearance and Reality, characterises metaphysics as an ‘antidote to dogmatic 
superstition’. If the analysis above is correct then it does its job perfectly well. 
Conversely, in the absence of such an analysis metaphysics appears to be more or 
less useless. 
Onwards and Upwards 
By standing back from metaphysics and identifying a completely general solution we 
have saved ourselves a vast amount of work. Now only one theory need be studied in 
depth. There would be little purpose in learning all about the theories that fail. For 
one of many such examples, (and tricky definitions notwithstanding), Freewill fails 
and Determinism fails. This ends the debate. What we need is a different explanation 
of these things and we would now know where to look for it. A neutral position would 
not endorse either extreme view but would reconcile them as aspects of a deeper 
truth. If the world is a unity then this principle can be generalised as a solution for all 
metaphysical antinomies. 
We have now broken the back of the problem of metaphysics at the level of 
principles. For a complete solution that might convince a sceptic we would have to go 
on to explore the implications of a neutral metaphysical position in detail, watching 
how all those ancient metaphysical dilemmas are untangled one by one when we 
adopt this unique and subtle cosmological theory. There would be a danger of ending 
up a Buddhist, or at least a sympathiser, but this sort of danger is what makes 
metaphysics so interesting. We are not playing for matches. 
From a certain perspective, then, the solution offered here is quite obvious. Many 
people arrive at it independently. At the same time, and this is an important feature, 
it is well enough disguised to account for why it is so often overlooked. Prior to a 
close investigation a neutral metaphysical position may easily appear to be a mere 
logical trick, an unreasonable or even irrational idea. Yet if all positive metaphysical 
positions fail then where else could the solution lie but in abandoning them? Is it 
really an unreasonable idea, or have we not quite understood it yet? 
Despite its prominence and pedigree, the idea of the unity of all being seems almost 
absent from our university philosophy. It has been absent, Heidegger suggests, since 
around the time of Plato. The result is stagnation and despondency. Perhaps, then, 
the central problem for metaphysics would be that it can be a hard pill to swallow. 
Not everybody wants an antidote against dogmas and false views. Regardless, the 
solution offered here works in logic, is consistent with experience and is not going to 
go away. It represents a sufficient explanation for why metaphysics can seem so 
difficult for it would become utterly impossible when we ignore this solution, yet 
render it relatively easy when we do not. Ignoring this solution would be a defining 
feature of any characteristically ‘western’ approach to metaphysical thinking, and a 
review of the literature since Plato will provide plentiful evidence of the futility of 
such an approach. 
In Summary 
In summary, metaphysics does not endorse a positive or partial theory but does 
endorse a neutral one, a theory for which our world would have to be just as 
Nagarjuna and the Buddha describe it. This is the situation and if we accept it then 
we have solved metaphysics. It would be impossible to prove that this is not the 
correct solution, as we would have to do in order to prove that any other theory is 
true, so it is job done. The solution for every metaphysical dilemma would be to 
abandon the two extreme views from which it is formed and to try to understand the 
alternative. 
We would treat these pairs of theories as category-errors and not as exhausting the 
possibilities, and so this solution causes no problems for classical logic. Indeed, it 
would be precisely the habit of scholastic philosophers of seeing these pairs of 
theories as true contradictory pairs for the dialectic, such that there could be no other 
option, that is the mistake and lapse of rigour referred to at the start of this essay, for 
it renders metaphysics intractable. Once this mistake is made nondualism appears to 
be paradoxical and so must be ruled out, rendering the world incomprehensible. 
This explains in outline one workable solution for all major problems of philosophy 
and the reason why these problems do not arise for the philosophical scheme of 
Middle Way Buddhism, Philosophical Taoism, Sufism, advaita Vedanta, the 
Christianity of A Course in Miracles and all other instances of the nondual doctrine. 
It is difficult to see why it should be a lot longer before all serious philosophers agree 
that an axiom of unity is the only solution for metaphysics that works. The problem 
of consciousness alone seems enough to show that a new idea is required in western 
though, and what other relevant new idea is available and likely to work? At least this 
one is well developed as a theory, has an extensive literature and has been tested 
beyond all hope of falsification. For now, however, we must keep busy defending 
metaphysics from the charge that it is useless, even though such a charge could only 
be laid by someone who has not noticed or refuses to consider the solution offered 
here. 
___ 
This essay has a sequel further discussing the philosophical mistake referred to 
here.  It is called Do We Regularly Make a Mistake in Metaphysics?  If it is not 
available in the same place as this one it is here 
https://theworldknot.wordpress.com/do-we-regularly-make-a-mistake-in-
metaphysics/ 
 
